Jonathan D. Halevi

For example, John Ging, the director of operations for UNRWA, told the New York Times in early 2009 that Israel’s blockade was choking off basic humanitarian supplies like medicine, clothing and blankets, as well as food supplies.1 The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in Occupied Palestinian Territory released a report in August 2009 arguing that “the blockade has ‘locked in’ 1.l5 million people.”2 The same report asserted that 75 percent of Gaza’s population is “food insecure.” Recently, Rep. Ron Paul (R-Texas) told Don Imus on the Fox Business Channel that Israel was “preventing food and medicine from going into Gaza.” He said there are “people that are starving,” and closed with a vile suggestion that the situation of the Gazans was “almost like in concentration camps.”3

The truth is far different from these assessments. Indeed, the repeated claims of a hermetic blockade of Gaza are inconsistent with the figures that emerge from Israeli and Palestinian sources alike. Gaza under Hamas control continues to receive supplies of goods via the border crossings with Israel and the network of tunnels with Egypt, which have become an established import channel on a scale of hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

The ongoing imports via the tunnel network provide employment to thousands of Palestinians and fill the coffers of the Hamas government through taxes on the operation of the tunnels and the goods that pass through them.

The Hamas government also enjoys funding from the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and from the European Union, in addition to aid from the Arab states.

Gaza’s gates are open for exit and entry by Palestinian residents, subject to approval by the Israeli and Egyptian authorities and in coordination with them. According to Palestinian figures, Israel and Egypt have approved more than 98 percent of Palestinian requests for medical treatment in their respective countries.

The tunnel network is also used by Hamas for military purposes, among them sending fighters for training in Iran and Syria, and for the import of advanced weapons systems (antiaircraft and antitank missiles), explosives, and ammunition.

In August 2005 Israel dismantled its settlements in Gaza and withdrew all of its forces and civilians to its own territory. The Disengagement Plan transferred full responsibility for administering Gaza to the Palestinian Authority, without any Israel presence, military or civil. Israel reserved the right of freedom of action to abort terror activities from Gaza.

The Disengagement Plan, whose major objective was to create “a better security reality,” stated that “Israel will supervise and secure the outer envelope of the geographical land mass, will exclusively control the airspace of Gaza, and will continue to carry out military operations in the territorial waters of Gaza,” and that “Israel retains the basic right to self-defense, including preemptive steps and response, with the use of force, against threats emanating from Gaza.”4

Several months after the implementation of the Disengagement Plan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed two agreements – the “Agreement on Movement and Access” and “Agreed Principles for the Rafah Crossing” – which regulated movement and access to and from Gaza. In these agreements, Israel, for the first time since 1967, relinquished its full control of Gaza’s outer envelope. According to these agreements, responsibility for the Rafah crossing was transferred to Egypt and the Palestinian Authority under the supervision of a Special Force of the European Union, and Israel agreed to the construction of seaports and an airfield in Gaza based on the model of international supervision at the Rafah crossing.5 The agreement, which was provisional for twelve months, was not renewed after it expired due to the refusal of the Hamas government to act in accordance with the agreement and its demand that the Rafah crossing be administered like a regular international crossing point between Gaza and Egypt.

After the military takeover of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007, Israel’s Security Cabinet approved a resolution on September 19, 2007, stating that “Hamas is a terrorist organization which took over Gaza and turned it into hostile territory. The organization takes hostile action against the State of Israel and its citizens and is the agent responsible for this activity.” In addition, the Security Cabinet approved the request of Defense Minister Ehud Barak for the option of imposing economic sanctions – including the reduction of fuel and of electricity, in accordance with legal counsel that would meet the

International and Israeli human rights organizations believe that the disengagement did not change Israel’s status as an “occupying power” in Gaza. In a communiqué published on November 14, 2008, eight human rights organizations in Israel claimed: “Even after the ‘disengagement’ from Gaza in 2005, Israel continues to hold significant control over the major aspects of the lives of Palestinians living in Gaza.”7 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also shared this view, which was confirmed in the Goldstone Commission Report that investigated Israel’s Gaza operation (Operation Cast Lead – December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009).8

Human rights organizations and the Goldstone Commission were very clear in their unequivocal declaration that Israel is still considered “an occupying power” in Gaza even after the disengagement, according to their interpretation of international law. Their demands on Israel focus on Israel fulfilling its obligations as these bodies interpret them, namely, to be responsible for the welfare of the residents of Gaza by removing the blockade and strengthening economic ties between Israel and Gaza.9

In an official communiqué on December 19, 2008, Egyptian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossam Zaki explained Egyptian policy toward Gaza:

The unilateral withdrawal by Israel from the Gaza Strip does not mean that Gaza has been liberated from occupation, since the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem together constitute one geographical unity that cannot be discussed in parts; otherwise this will be considered a death blow to their unity.

According to international law and the Geneva Convention, Israel is considered an occupying force and is still obligated to provide for the basic necessities of life, among them electricity, water, fuel, and medicine to the residents living in the territory under its occupation.

Any agreement with the contention that the Gaza Strip is liberated land demonstrates acquiescence with the plan that aspires to impose the responsibility for administering the Gaza Strip on the neighbor close to it, which is Egypt. We must not agree to this because it will be an excellent extrication for Israel from the straits of occupation, while transferring its consequences to Egypt, and this will lead to the eradication of the Palestinian problem.10

Thus, there are two dimensions to the Egyptian position: not letting Israel off the hook and not making Cairo responsible for Gaza in the future.

Moreover, Egypt has made a direct connection between the operation of the Rafah crossing and the Hamas government’s position on the issue of reconciliation talks with Fatah and with the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas. Through the reconciliation talks that were held with Egyptian pressure and mediation, Cairo has strived and continues to strive to convince the Hamas government to operate the Rafah crossing according to the Crossings Agreement of 2005, which was in effect for one year only as agreed upon by the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. On the eve of reconciliation talks in October 2009, senior defense officials in Egypt threatened Hamas that they would totally shut down the Rafah crossing if the Hamas government refused to sign the reconciliation agreement.11

Is the Israeli and Egyptian blockade of Gaza causing consequences as dire as those described by the human rights organizations? U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said in testimony before Congress on April 22, 2009, that the situation in Gaza is different from how it has been described. In response to a question by Congressman Keith Ellison (D-Minn.), Clinton said: “Congressman, the crossings are no longer completely closed. There are many items that are being transported through the crossings....We have looked at the lists and a lot of what has been said was not permitted to cross [into Gaza] is just not accurate.”12

A survey by Israel’s Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories presents the scope of connections between Israel and Gaza in 2009:13

• Health: 10,544 patients and their companions left Gaza in 2009 for medical treatment in Israel. 4,883 tons of medical equipment and medicines entered Gaza that year in coordination with the Palestinian Authority and international agencies. Israel helped the Palestinian Authority stem the spread of avian (bird) flu in Gaza; 44,500 doses of vaccine were sent to Gaza through the World Health Organization, and three patients left Gaza for medical care in Israel. In addition, two elevators were transferred to hospitals in Gaza, as well as mammogram equipment for breast cancer detection and a computerized CT system.

• Electricity: Israel continued to supply electricity to Gaza from its power plant in Ashkelon. In addition, 41 truckloads of equipment were transferred for the maintenance of the electrical system in Gaza. Between April and October 2009, Siemens carried out maintenance work on the power system in Gaza, to which more than 100 million liters of diesel fuel were delivered for its operation.

• Communications: 45 truckloads of communication equipment were sent to Gaza at the request of the Palestinian Authority.

• Water and sewage: 95 truckloads of equipment for water and sewage systems, as well as 3,720 tons of chloride for water purification, were transferred during 2009. Israel assisted the North Gaza Wastewater Treatment Plant Project by transferring 48 truckloads of equipment for the project.

• The private sector: 77 percent of the contents of trucks sent into Gaza in 2009 were for the private sector. 257 Palestinian businessmen exited Gaza to Israel, the West Bank, and abroad. 10,871 head of cattle were transferred to Gaza, mainly for the Ramadan and Eid al-Adha holidays. In preparation for winter, 3,607 tons of glass for windows was transferred to Gaza.

• Money: Over NIS 1.1 billion (approximately $300 million) was transferred to Gaza in 2009 to fund salaries and the activities of international organizations. In addition, NIS 40 million (approximately $10 million) in worn banknotes were replaced. In February 2010, Israel and the Palestinian Authority reached an agreement on the transfer of social security payments and pensions to beneficiaries in Gaza who have worked in Israel. The money is to be transferred to Palestinian banks in the West Bank, and the Palestinian Authority can then deliver the money to beneficiaries in Gaza.

• Humanitarian aid: 141,390 tons of humanitarian aid were transferred by the international community through Israel, including 115,043 tons of food and 2,990 tons of medicines and medical equipment.

• Entry of international organizations: 21,200 foreign staff members and over 400 diplomatic delegations entered Gaza in 2009.

• UNRWA: 3,282,000 liters of fuel and diesel were transferred for use by UNRWA. In addition, special equipment for summer camps, including swimming pools, ice cream machines, musical instruments, and sports equipment were transferred to UNRWA.

• Agricultural export: The export of flowers and strawberries was approved as part of a joint project with the government of the Netherlands. Since the beginning of the project, more than 7 million flowers and 54 tons of strawberries were exported.

• Leaving Gaza: As noted, 10,544 patients (and their companions) exited Gaza. 147 students exited Gaza for academic studies abroad, in response to requests made by the international community. 374 Christians exited Gaza to spend Christmas in Israel and Bethlehem, while 100 Christians exited Gaza to participate in the pope’s visit to the Holy Land in May 2009. 17 representatives exited Gaza to participate in the Fatah General Convention in Bethlehem, and approval was given for players on the Palestinian soccer team to leave Gaza for training and friendship games in the West Bank and abroad.

According to the report of the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, a total of 7,233 truckloads of humanitarian aid from the international community passed from Israel to Gaza in 2009. In addition, the Crossings and Border Authority of Hamas also published a report detailing the traffic through the border crossings for 2009, showing that 63,480 people passed through the Rafah crossing to and from Egypt during the year.14

The governor of the Central Bank of the Palestinian Authority, Jihad al-Wazir, reported that since June 2007 (the date of the Hamas military takeover of Gaza), overall monetary transfers to Gaza have totaled over $5 billion from governmental and extragovernmental sources.15 He was referring to the funds sent to pay the salaries of civil servants in Gaza, international organizations operating in Gaza such as UNRWA, and foreign communication networks that operate in the Strip. Al-Wazir confirmed that 56 percent of the PA budget is designated for Gaza. Mahmoud Abbas told the Saudi newspaper Al-Watan on December 31, 2009, that the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah transfers 58 percent of its budget to the Hamas government to pay its expenses for electricity and water, while the Hamas government collects taxes from the residents for the services that it receives for free. He stated that the import tunnels under the Gaza border provide all the consumer goods required in Gaza, except for iron and cement.16

Gaza receives additional aid funds directly from Iran and the Arab countries. The Hamas government’s health minister, Bassam Naim, reported on March 21, 2010, that the Hamas government received a grant of $40 million from the Islamic Development Bank and the Qatar Red Crescent Society to purchase equipment for the hospitals in Gaza.17

In addition, the Hamas government also benefits from aid that is given on the purchase of goods and services for Gaza. Until November 20, 2009, the European Union paid the cost of industrial diesel fuel to operate Gaza’s power plant, an amount estimated at NIS 50 million per month (over $13 million), for a total exceeding $156 million per year.18

The Hamas government also receives funds to cover the cost of electricity that is supplied by Israel.19

“Smuggling” is not the correct word to describe the network of tunnels along Gaza’s border with Egypt. Whereas smuggling connotes illegal activity carried out clandestinely, the Palestinian tunnel network is out in the open and extends the whole length of the border.

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) published an abstract in May 2009 of an investigative article that appeared on the Al Arabiya network which presents

the method of operation of the tunnels on the Gaza-Egypt border. The following are the main points as described on the ITIC website:

The reporter for the Al Arabiya network, Waal Issam, toured Egyptian Rafah, in the market where goods sent to Gaza through the tunnels are sold. The report said that the market is the major source of the fuel supply to Gaza. Some 10,000 people work in the “tunnel industry” on a daily basis. The value of the trade via the tunnels is estimated at approximately $200 million annually. Along the border, which is some 13 kilometers long, nearly 800 tunnels have been excavated. According to the report, most of the tunnels that were attacked during Operation Cast Lead have been reconstructed. The smugglers who were interviewed claimed that a tunnel can be built nowadays in 10-15 days. One of the smugglers reported that the tunnels end in buildings, groves, chicken coops, etc.20

According to a report by Palestinian researcher Ghazi al-Surani from December 2008, the tunnel network has brought about an increase in imports from Egypt to Gaza from $30 million annually during the years 1994-2006 to more than $650 million annually.21 Ziad Jarghoun reported in a study of the Gaza tunnels that in December 2008, the Rafah municipality and the security forces stopped the excavation of new tunnels because there were too many. In addition, he said the price of diesel fuel and gasoline, delivered to Gaza through pipes from Egypt, is half that of the price in Israel.22

The Palestinian tunnels also serve as a pipeline for the import of cement and iron – items barred from entering Gaza via Israel. On February 11, 2010, the Palestinian news agency qudsnet.com reported a drop in the price of cement imported via the tunnels. The lower price stems from an increase in the import of cement via the tunnels. One tunnel owner said he is capable of transferring more than 60 tons of cement a day, but that most tunnel owners are no longer bringing in cement, preferring to concentrate on importing iron. Issam Sha’ath, owner of Sha’ath Construction Equipment, explained that cement prices fell after some 80 percent of tunnel owners began to import cement, as compared to 30 percent in the past.23

In February 2010, the Palestinian media reported a drop in the price of construction materials in recent months along with a rise in activity in the building industry. Farid Zakout, director of the Gaza Construction Association, said in an interview with the Palestinian newspaper Al-Ayyam that tunnel owners in Rafah on the Egyptian border have been cutting back on the transfer of consumer goods in light of the volume of merchandise flooding the markets in Gaza, and are looking instead to increase the import of cement and iron. This trend has led, in his view, to a drop in the price of both these items on the local markets. He added that close to one-third of activity in the construction industry – including the manufacture of cinder blocks, floor tiles, and cement – has returned to normal levels during the past two months. Zakout noted further that the price of a ton of cement now stands at NIS 800 as opposed to NIS 1,200 two months ago, and over NIS 3,000 more than a year ago. The renewed surge in construction activity has fostered a rise of 25 percent in the number of those employed in the industry.24

The rise in imports from Egypt via the Rafah tunnels has led to a situation where a number of tunnels have been closed due to the flooding of the Gaza market with imported goods. “Abu Ahmed,” who operates a tunnel on the Egyptian border, stated in this vein that tunnel owners are now trying to sell them at low cost since the income from operating them has plummeted from $7,000 per ton of merchandise to only $100. Moreover, he added, the number of tunnels in operation has plunged to just 200 from a peak of 1,200, with the total number of workers in the tunnels declining greatly from 12,000 to only 1,000.25

The Christian Science Monitor, relying on conversations with businessmen in Gaza, reports that the Hamas government is benefiting financially from the “blockade” by virtue of its control of the tunnels on the Egyptian border, through a 14.5 percent value-added tax on goods that pass through the tunnels (with an even higher levy on cigarettes), as well as money changing activities and tax revenues. The vast sums of money flowing into Hamas’ treasury are being used for the purchase of land and buildings throughout Gaza.26 In testimony before the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 25, 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked: “Much of the material that gets in to Gaza, which still comes through the tunnels – through smuggling – actually is taxed by Hamas, which then provides Hamas with the money that they use to buy arms and other material that is used against Israel.”27

In an interview with the French newspaper Le Monde on October 10, 2009, Bassem Khoury, minister of national economy for the Palestinian Authority, offered this description:

The shelves of the stores are full, and you can find anything you want if you can pay the price. The cost of real estate has tripled as a result of the tunnel economy. Hamas is benefiting from the situation, since the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah is continuing to pay the salaries of civil servants in Gaza and this is half of our budget. Then these employees buy goods that come in by way of the tunnels, on which Hamas gets paid a tax. The result: the Palestinian Authority’s economy is cut off from the VAT revenues that were previously collected [by Israel] for goods imported into Gaza, while Hamas doesn’t know what to do with its money.

Similar stories could be found elsewhere in the reports of Western newsmen who actually visited Gaza. Thus, on June 3, 2010, Janine Zacharia of the Washington Post wrote: “If you walk down Gaza City’s main thoroughfare – Salah al-Din Street – grocery stores are stocked wall-too-wall with everything from fresh Israeli yogurts and hummus to Cocoa Puffs smuggled in from Egypt. Pharmacies look as well-supplied as a typical Rite Aid in the United States.”29 The Palestinian Ma’an News Agency also stated on February 19, 2010, that “Gaza markets are saturated with goods.”30

From these accounts, which are corroborated by a wealth of additional material from Palestinian sources on tunnel activity, there appears to be an established economic system of Palestinian imports from Egypt via hundreds of tunnels operating under the control of a Hamas government that grants approval for operating them and collects taxes from their owners. Claims that child labor is rampant in the tunnels are apparently unsubstantiated, however. Based on figures of the Palestinian human rights organization Al Mezan, as of November 2, 2009, 120 Palestinians have been killed in the tunnels and only four of them were under the age of 18.31

The tunnel network on the Gaza border also serves the operational needs of Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations, including those identified with al-Qaeda. The Israel Security Agency reported in December 2008 that the tunnel network is used for “smuggling in weapons, in particular standard-grade, high-quality weapons such as the Grad rockets that were fired at Ashkelon...; smuggling operatives out for training abroad, primarily in Syria and Iran; bringing in combat experts, trainers, and ‘engineers’; and bringing back to Gaza ‘graduates’ of military training, who have completed their instruction abroad.”32

The tunnel network also serves such criminal purposes as drug running33 and trafficking in young women. In an article published on December 28, 2009, in the Kuwaiti newspaper Awan, journalist Shima Yusuf reported on the phenomenon of “importing” minor girls from Egypt and selling them into prostitution in Gaza, supposedly for purposes of marriage or domestic work. A report by UNICEF confirmed the selling of young Egyptian girls from impoverished villages to wealthy older men in other Arab states.34

The position of the human rights organizations, which paint an exaggerated picture of the effects of the siege, is marred by a double standard. On the one hand, they argue vehemently that Israel is still an occupying power and must therefore see to the “security and welfare of the residents of Gaza”; yet on the other hand, the welfare and security of Gaza’s residents have been severely harmed by the Hamas regime, with its gradual imposition of Islamic law while violently suppressing the opposition.

The human rights organizations demand that Israel act according to a higher moral standard than that required of other states. According to their logic, Israel is obligated to help an enemy entity that is attacking it. If this were true, the United States would have a duty to extend assistance to villages in Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban fighters who are attacking coalition forces.

While these organizations insist that Israel open its borders to an enemy entity, these same groups refrain from presenting similar demands to Egypt, which borders Gaza but does not define the Hamas government as an enemy entity. Yet Egypt strenuously rejects

the demand by Hamas and the Arab states to open its border with Gaza. Egypt’s use of restrictions on the passage of goods and people across the border is a form of leverage, intended to push Hamas into accepting Egypt’s terms for opening the border on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access.