BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 104, April 8, 2010

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Iranian nuclear threat has obscured the

possibility of waging nuclear terrorism against Israel. There is a clear

rationale for employing nuclear terrorism and countering it needs calibrated

policies of prevention and possibly US-Israeli cooperation. The time to

prepare for the Armageddon scenario is now.

For the past 15 years, Israel's focus on the Iranian nuclear threat has been nearly

all-encompassing, eclipsing virtually all other threats. While understandable,

this preoccupation may have distracted Israel from a threat which may be no

less likely and actually far more dangerous; nuclear terrorism. Unlike

"traditional" terrorism, nuclear terrorism poses a catastrophic threat to the state.

Moreover, those most likely to conduct nuclear terrorism (al-Qaeda, Hizballah,

Hamas, Iran, and others) may be fundamentally nihilistic and thus

undeterrable. As millennial movements who believe that Israel's destruction is a

sacred mission, they may view a nuclear attack, even assuming a devastating

Israeli response, to be a worthy means of ushering in a messianic era.

A nuclear terrorist threat against Israel might be designed for:

• Actual Use – to deal Israel a devastating blow

• Deterrence – to counter Israel's conventional superiority and purported

nuclear capability, to deter Israeli attacks, or to conduct attacks with

• Compellence – to exert a decisive influence on Israeli decision making

during crises or over fundamental issues, holding it hostage by the threat

• Weakening – to severely erode Israel's national resilience due to the

ongoing need to live in the shadow of nuclear terrorism

• Back Up – to strengthen the deterrent value of a state-based (Iranian or

Syrian) capability

• Decapitation – to remove the Israeli political and/or military leadership

The potential means of conducting nuclear terrorism against Israel would be

Policy Options

Prevention

Prevention includes a variety of intelligence, interdiction, and other offensive

measures to detect and prevent a nuclear terrorist capability from being

developed or used. If still under development, Israel will have sufficient time to

pursue a range of preventative options, alone and in conjunction with the US,

from targeted to massive military operations. Once a capability exists, the

window for action will be severely attenuated and preventative efforts will

have to include any and all capabilities to guarantee success at all costs. While a

unilateral Israeli operation might be sufficient if the capability is still being

Deterrence

Deterrence is commonly thought to be ineffective against nuclear terrorism, due

to the presumed nihilistic nature of potential perpetrators. However, Hizballah

and Hamas, while certainly extremist, have populations for which they take

responsibility and have proven over the years to be deterrable. Although their

acquisition of a nuclear capability would pose severe threats, such as the ability

to terrorize Israel's population with relative impunity, it does place them in the

appropriate context.

Iran would presumably be willing to suffer great losses in pursuit of Israel's

destruction, but would have to take into account that Israel is considered by the

international community to be a nuclear power and that a nuclear crisis could

lead to a devastating exchange. While a precise assessment of Iran's cost-benefit

analysis is unknowable, it does appear to be fundamentally rational and thus

deterrable.

The biggest question mark is in regard to al-Qaeda, whose presumed nihilism

may indeed make it undeterrable. It is questionable whether this would truly be

the case in the face of threats of annihilation of their leadership and families,

Muslim population centers, and sites of major importance to the Muslim world.

Potential perpetrators of nuclear terrorism must be convinced that Israel will

preempt/retaliate devastatingly. For Israel, this means a “shoot first, no

questions asked” policy. Both those clearly responsible for an actual attack (if

any) and those reasonably suspected of involvement must be held accountable,

and Israel must retaliate with all the means at its disposal. In the absence of

irrefutable and immediate evidence to the contrary, Israel’s retaliatory policy

should hold Iran and/or al-Qaeda responsible with an absence of irrefutable

and immediate evidence to the contrary. In the event of a declared nuclear

terrorist capability, a stated intention to acquire one, or an advanced suspected

one, the known or suspected perpetrator and host country should be attacked

in advance with the amount of all of the force necessary to prevent the threat’s

materialization.

As a global power, the US will be unlikely to adopt such a “no questions asked”

policy and will require nuclear forensics. Nevertheless, American

determination to prevent nuclear terrorism and retaliate devastatingly against

those responsible must be beyond question. US declaratory policy on the

nuclear terrorist threat to Israel would not need to be significantly different

from its posture on nuclear terrorism generally, but could be further elucidated.

US-Israeli Cooperation

As with so many other areas of Israeli national security, cooperation with the

US is a primary option for dealing with nuclear terrorism. In this case, however,

the US would only be able to provide limited assistance. “Extended deterrence”

would have little if any value in the face of nihilistic terrorists. Heightened

cooperative preventative efforts, while important, may not suffice when the US

lacks a satisfactory response to nuclear terrorism.

Conversely, global American efforts to minimize the threat of nuclear terrorism

might be of significant indirect benefit for Israel. These efforts include, inter

alia: heightened diplomacy to make better international use of existing

diplomatic tools and to adopt new ones; intensified pressure on states to deny

terrorists assistance and sanctuary; improvements in control over nuclear

facilities, stockpiles and personnel; strengthening the NPT; heightened

international cooperation regarding border security, export controls,

intelligence sharing, and interdiction; and a variety of covert operations.

Ending Nuclear Ambiguity

Israel is widely thought by foreign observers to be nuclear and any potential

perpetrator of nuclear terrorism must take this into account. It is doubtful

whether ending nuclear ambiguity would be of significant deterrent value.

Defensive Measures

Israel has an extensive operational homeland security system (Arrow and Iron

Dome) and an attacker must consider the probability of interception and

massive retaliation. However, if “only” one nuclear warhead got through, this

would constitute unacceptable failure for Israel, rendering defensive measures

an insufficient option.

Conclusion

To date, no terrorist group has apparently acquired a nuclear weapon or the

materials needed to make one. Al-Qaeda has tried repeatedly, but currently the

technical challenges are daunting. This good news comes with a crucial caveat;

it is true only “as far as we know.” Even if the risk may be low at this time, the

potential costs are monstrous and the threat assessment is likely to change

significantly in the coming years. Israel must take into account that a nuclear

terrorist threat could emerge in the foreseeable future and therefore devote

greater attention and resources to it, in order to develop the necessary doctrine

and undertake the preparations possible. The time to act is now.

Chuck Freilich is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, an Adjunct Professor

at New York University, and a former Deputy National Security Adviser in Israel. This

perspective is based on a more comprehensive study to be published by the Begin-Sadat

(BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.