Riduci       Ingrandisci
Clicca qui per stampare

 
Dror Bar Yosef- Una terza intifada ? 16/11/2009
Shalem Center, Issue No. 20 November 16, 2009
Shalem Center, Issue No. 20   November 16, 2009

A Third Intifada?
 by Dror Bar Yosef
 
Dror Bar Yosef, coordinator for programs in the Palestinian Authority at the Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies, explains how internal disputes among the Fatah leadership stall Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations and may lead to another outbreak of violence.
Since President Obama assumed leadership of the United States, intensive diplomatic efforts have been made to renew the peace negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. The new spirit in the White House has attained some significant achievements. First, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that an independent Palestinian state will be part of the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For the first time, an Israeli government has agreed to freeze the construction of new homes in Gush Etzion and Ma'ale Adumim, two major settlement blocs in the Jerusalem suburbs (although this settlement freeze does not apply to East Jerusalem). Lastly, in September 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Abu Mazen publicly met.

Nevertheless, it seems that the United States' efforts have only further distanced the Israelis and Palestinians, and have not led the sides to announce the renewal of peace negotiations. This stalemate is neither new nor surprising. While it can perhaps be viewed as a tactical move on the part of the negotiators, the reality on the ground is quite disturbing. The recent months have been marked by violent demonstrations in Jerusalem, a call by many prominent Palestinian leaders to organize a new, nonviolent intifada against Israel, and statements by Palestinians that a two state solution might not be possible, due to settlement activity. An analysis of recent developments reveals that even though a new intifada won't be fought in the near future, it could erupt in several months' time; in fact, we are witnessing how Palestinian society and its leadership have begun laying the groundwork, at least in terms of the public opinion, for such an option. What is so surprising is that Palestinians have remained unfazed by what Israel perceived as 'historic' gestures towards Abu Mazen. In fact, the crisis has been bolstered by internal conflicts plaguing the Palestinian political arena; Israeli-Palestinian relations are not the sole factor contributing to the current escalation.

The Palestinian political landscape has undergone many changes over the last few years, mainly due to the unprecedented crisis between Fatah and Hamas. Current tensions and the failure to reform the 'Palestinian Home,' both within and between the major political parties, have led to widespread frustration among the Fatah leadership and Palestinian people. Scholars widely believe that the competition between the groups over the Palestinian leadership makes likelihood of a Palestinian state nearly impossible. In a similar vein, the Fatah-Hamas schism has been blamed for the outcome of the war in Gaza last winter. The tension between the movements reached new heights after Hamas refused the recent Egyptian proposal to reunite Gaza and the West Bank under one governing system.

The unresolved tension between the two movements is not the only political crisis that the Palestinians are facing. Fatah’s internal conflicts are entirely unrelated to the peace process with Israel – in fact, many leaders of the Tanzim faction within Fatah, including Kadura Fares, Hatem Abd El-Qader and Mohamad Hurani, have openly supported Abu Mazen’s positions, including a two-state solution and a compromise on the right of return. They have also publicly stated that the last intifada, including its bloody terror attacks, was a mistake (despite still refusing to publicly accept Israel as a Jewish state). The reason so many Palestinian leaders’ refuse to back Abu Mazen is primarily a function of internal political considerations.

In many respects, Abu Mazen's success in the August 2009 Fatah convention worked against him, giving him a specious feeling of self-confidence and popular support. Tensions between Abu Mazen and his party emerged after his striking success in convening the Fatah convention, and his candidates' electoral victory in the Central Committee. This victory was mired by harsh allegations by many Fatah activists who claimed incongruity between votes cast and the official results. Leaders in the Tanzim accepted the outcome, but criticized Abu Mazen and the electoral process off-the-record quite strongly. They felt that their faction’s popularity, as evinced by their winning the majority of seats in the Revolutionary Council, was intentionally and illegitimately stifled during elections for the Central Committee.

Amidst this turmoil, Abu Mazen's declared legislative and presidential elections would be held on January 24th 2010, in which he would not run. The declaration brought the previous crises to a new height. Many Fatah members were torn between their fear of Abu Mazen’s replacement and their criticism towards his handling of the Goldstone report and relations with Hamas.

The upcoming election is a complex issue with many implications, especially if Abu Mazen will indeed not run. A more dramatic development might be Abu Mazen following through on his threats and resigning, causing other senior Palestinian Authority officials to follow his lead. But in almost every scenario, the elections will be marked by rhetoric that will prove unhelpful to resuming negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians, while lending credence to a renewed struggle against Israel.

 This development, which could foretell the end of the Palestinian Authority, will pave the road for a new intifada and Palestinian call for a one- state solution. As long as the Palestinian political landscape remains on the current trajectory, including holding elections and Abu Mazen's retirement, the current Palestinian Authority leadership will lack the legitimacy to negotiate with Israel and the United States. They will face public criticism alone, without the public help of any noteworthy Palestinian public figures, much as Abu Mazen stood alone when he agreed to postpone discussions on the Goldstone report in the United Nations.

Moreover, the stalemate between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which is a natural result of the aforementioned crises, will lead to a fierce deterioration of the current calm. In a recent interview in 'Maan News Agency', Marwan Barghouti said the "PLO Executive Committee, with all of its factions, should set a plan and vision for a wide popular and peaceful movement against settlements. We need the Executive Committee, the factions, and Palestinian Legislative Council members to turn up the heat on popular demonstrations." It is important to remember that prominent Palestinian figures had attributed the previous intifada to two equal causes: Israel and the Palestinian Authority. They claim that one of the intifada’s major goals was to push for reforms within the Palestinian political arena. Today, the same reasons are being cited to explain the current escalation, which is indeed taking place regardless of recent developments in the peace negotiations with Israel.

If Abu Mazen can incorporate the young Fatah leadership in the decision making process, he, and the peace process, will receive more Palestinian public support. Barghouti’s involvement in the peace process will grant Abu Mazen more flexibility. But on the current trajectory, further concessions by Israel and the United States will have limited effect.

If this is the case, what will the future look like? The boiling point might be a non violent intifada against Israel, characterized more by rocks and Molotov cocktails than suicide bombers, and backed by strong international judicial and diplomatic activity. The Palestinians will utilize international objection to the settlements to demand a one-state solution, with a 'one man one vote' political system. For Israel, annexation of the West Bank and granting full and equal political rights to the Palestinians unequivocally means an end to Israel as a Jewish state.

In conclusion, the current stalemate and the increasing tension between the Israelis and Palestinians is not due only to the ongoing building in West Bank settlements; the internal political struggle in the Palestinian Authority, the Fatah-Hamas crisis, the difficulties within the Fatah and Abu Mazen's declaration that he will not re-run for President, have all contributed to the deterioration of relations in the Israeli-Palestinian-American triangle.
 

Condividi sui social network:



Se ritieni questa pagina importante, mandala a tutti i tuoi amici cliccando qui