Pressure Mounts on Iran Uranium Enrichment Program
How does the deal work?
Concerns over Iran’s nuclear program are growing globally – but what exactly composes the deal with Iran agreed upon during talks with the P5+1 on October 1, 2009, with Iran to ship more than three-quarters of its stockpile of nuclear fuel out of the country?
World leaders are currently discussing the idea of sending Iran’s fuel to Russia and France for further enrichment. On October 1, 2009, Iran agreed to use its own uranium to refuel a research reactor in Tehran. [1] Russia would be responsible for further enriching the uranium and it would sub-contract the additional processing to France. [2]
On October 25, 2009, officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are expected to inspect a uranium enrichment facility plant near the city of Qom in Iran, the existence of which had been secret until September 2009. On October 28, 2009, negotiators from Iran and the P5+1 (five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) are due to meet to discuss a proposal to exchange a moratorium on new sanctions for a freeze in Iran’s enrichment program. [3]
On October 21, 2009, IAEA ambassador and head of the Iranian delegation, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, said that Iran would be in a position to "get the fuel" for its research reactor which makes isotopes for medical uses such as cancer treatment. [4]
In summer 2008, Iran asked the IAEA for help in finding replacement fuel for its research reactor. The reactor takes uranium enriched to about 20 percent, which is much higher than the 5 percent Iran already makes as fuel for power generating reactors. The IAEA and US officials quickly saw an opportunity to intervene diplomatically. If Iran could be convinced to use its own uranium stockpile (which is already enough in theory to make a bomb), it would not be available for weapons program. [5]
What is uranium?
Uranium is a heavy material, which can be used as a source of concentrated energy. Like many other chemical elements, uranium has several isotopes. One of these "types", can be used to make a nuclear weapon. It is separated from the most common isotope, U-238, in the centrifuge because the isotopes have different masses. This process is called uranium enrichment. [6]
What happens inside a nuclear reactor?
The production of energy in nuclear reactors is from the "fission", which means the splitting of the U-235 atoms. This process releases energy in the form of heat. Natural uranium contains 0.7% of the U-235 isotope. The remaining 99.3% is mostly the U-238 isotope, which does not contribute directly to the fission process. The difference in masses between the U-235 and the U-238 makes it possible to increase or "enrich" the percentage of U-235. [7]
Enrichment plants produce either low-enriched uranium (LEU) for nuclear power plants, which contains around 5% U-235, or high-enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons, which contains 85%-90% U-235. Processing begins with uranium ore, which is being milled to produce a compound called "yellow cake". This is converted to uranium hexafluoride gas (UF6), which is pumped into a gas centrifuge and spun around at high speed. [8]
What does conversion mean?
The first step in the production of uranium is to convert ore to uranium-hexafluoride, a gas that has to be cleaned and filtered for being used. [9] Afterwards it gets filled into a centrifuge for further treatment. Conversion of LEU to HEU requires an additional stock of LEU for proper enrichment. Enriched uranium is suitable for use in a nuclear weapon once the concentration U-235 reaches about 90%.
How do gas centrifuges work?
Gas centrifuges are being used for uranium enrichment to make either fuel for nuclear reactors or fissionable material for nuclear weapons. It takes tens of thousands of centrifuges to produce enough fuel for a commercial reactor. [10] A centrifuge method converts uranium ore, in the form of a gas, to LEU. The process is repeated many times over through a cascade of centrifuges to create uranium of the desired level of enrichment. [11] The resulting LEU acquired from the gas centrifuge process serves as the basic material necessary to produce HEU – or weapons-grade uranium.
What is plutonium?
The most difficult step on building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material. One can either make plutonium-239 in a nuclear reactor or enrich uranium. [12] There are two different kinds of plutonium: reactor-grade and weapons-grade. Plutonium, in both cases, is a valuable energy source when integrated into the nuclear fuel cycle. [13]
Plutonium is formed in nuclear power reactors from uranium. Plutonium-239 (Pu-239) is a nuclear fission fuel that is produced in large quantities in nuclear reactors from U-238.
What is heavy water production?
Heavy water (D20) combines oxygen with deuterium instead of normal hydrogen. Heavy water can be used as a nuclear moderator, controlling the rate of fission in the reactor. [14] Heavy water is present naturally in water but only in small amounts.
The importance of heavy water to nuclear proliferators is that it provides one more route to produce plutonium for use in weapons, entirely bypassing uranium enrichment and all of the related technological infrastructure. [15]
What is a nuclear warhead?
A nuclear warhead is the warhead of a missile containing an atom bomb and represents the explosive part of a nuclear weapons system. Warheads consist of nuclear materials, conventional high explosives, related firing mechanisms and containment structure. [16]
Uranium enrichment is only part of building a nuclear weapon, though it is the most difficult step. The two remaining steps are designing and building a warhead, and building a reliable delivery system, like a ballistic missile. [17]
What are the benefits if Iran ships its nuclear fuel?
If Iran uses its own low-enriched uranium (LEU) – produced in violation of UN Security Council resolutions – to fuel a reactor in Tehran used for medical purposes, American officials say that that use would set aside, for about a year, fears that Iran could use the fuel to produce a nuclear weapon. After that, Iran’s ongoing production of uranium would refill its stockpiles. [18]
If the West can persuade Iran to give up much of its actual fuel stockpile, Iran will be unable to pose a nuclear threat. This would delay Iran’s immediate potential to make a nuclear weapon. However, during talks in Vienna between Iranian and American officials, which started October 20, 2009, a Western diplomat who attended the discussions said: "We don’t know at this point whether this project will go forward or not." Furthermore, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said on October 20, 2009, that Iran would never give up that capacity. [19]
Successful talks could be used to build confidence between Iran and the West. [20]
What are the consequences if Iran refuses to commit itself to ship out its nuclear fuel?
Tehran’s refusal to give up most of its enriched stockpile could abort chances of a second round of broader negotiations between Iran, the US, Britain, Russia, France, Germany and China. [21]
The major issue of negotiations with Iran lies in how much of Iran’s estimated stockpile of LEU it is willing to turn over as part of the agreement. During talks in Geneva on October 1, 2009, the tentative quantity has been put at 1200 kilograms or as much as 75 percent of Iran’s declared stockpile. If the conditions agreed upon in Geneva hold, it would be significant as 1000 kilograms is the commonly accepted threshold of LEU needed for production of weapons-grade enriched uranium, also known as high-enriched uranium (HEU). [22]
If Iran does not commit itself to ship its nuclear fuel but decides to continue its actual uranium enrichment program, this could cause a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Other states in the region might feel they must match Iran’s ambitions. Over the past three years a large number of states in the Middle East – including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Libya, have begun civilian nuclear programs. These programs, however, seem to be a "hedge against Iran". [23] Therefore the danger does not seem to be a nuclear Iran alone, but a nuclear-armed Middle East.
Concerns over the spread of radical Shia Islamist ideologies in Iran continue to receive international attention. There is evidence that Iran and Shi’ite Muslims constitute an enemy akin to the West. [24] Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Iran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized and otherwise supported numerous terrorist organizations such as Hamas, Hizballah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. [25]
What is the status quo of Iran’s nuclear development program?
The production of fissile material in the form of uranium enrichment establishes the foundation for Iran’s nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s current uranium enrichment activity allows it to produce LEU from natural uranium ore. A key milestone will be reached when Iran accumulates enough LEU to break out and quickly produce weapons-grade uranium. An accumulation of approximately 700-800 kilograms of 4% enriched LEU would unquestionably provide Iran with enough LEU for a breakout capability whereby it could produce 20-25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a nuclear weapon. [26]
Iran’s main enrichment facilities, the principal Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the test Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), both at Natanz, form the core of the uranium enrichment program. As of November 2008, the IAEA confirmed that enrichment activities, including expansion of centrifuges, continued at these two facilities. [27]
The Iranian program is based on P1 centrifuges, which are the original Pakistani design. The rule of thumb is that it would take 1500 P1 centrifuges operation for a year to produce 28 kilograms of HEU. This is enough for one weapon. [28] Iran is also trying to develop P2 centrifuges – devices that are capable of making weapons-grade uranium more efficiently than theP1 technology currently in use. [29]
Experts believe that Iran could enrich enough uranium for a bomb within a few months. The controversy over Iran’s nuclear production, however, is really about whether Iran is capable of producing nuclear warheads. [30]
Is Iran only playing for time?
Tehran has yet to answer to a key question of whether it is prepared to freeze its nuclear program. According to Javier Solana, the European envoy, Iran has still to provide a "complete answer" [31] to this question, more than a year after the offer was first proposed. The six world powers reiterated a "freeze-for-freeze" proposal, in which Iran would halt its uranium enrichment and the building of more centrifuges in exchange for no more new sanctions against the Islamic Republic. [32]
The biggest risk remains that Iran is playing for time, as they have often been accused of doing in the past, making promised and encouraging more meetings, while waiting for political currents to change or the closest ranks among the Western allies to break. [33] The West views that Iran is indeed playing for time and not interested in settling the nuclear dispute. [34]
Has Iran previously deceived the international community?
Despite numerous resolutions issued by the UN Security Council as well as sanctions imposed by Europe, Iran continues to ignore all international actions designed to pressure it to stop its uranium enrichment program. Instead, the Islamic Republic called the sanctions illegal [35], Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad dismissed them as a "childish idea and a big mistake" [36] and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Iran has “shown world powers they cannot block its nuclear progress. [37]
Bruno Tertrais, a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris and a former advisor on nuclear strategy to the French Defense Ministry said: "I think the most likely scenario is still Iran dragging its feet and trying to divide the international community. I’d be very surprised if a final deal were concluded and implemented." [38]
Can Iran be trusted to stick with the shipment-deal?
Iranian negotiators have agreed to the draft deal that would delay Iran’s ability to build a nuclear bomb for a year. The arrangement will still have to be approved by October 23, 2009, in Tehran and Washington. If the leadership in Tehran agrees to the accord, which according to negotiators was not assured, it will remove enough nuclear fuel from Iran to delay any work on a nuclear weapon until the country can refill ist stockpile of fuel. [39]
If approved, the deal could also buy time for Iran to continue expanding its ability to produce nuclear fuel at its facility in Natanz. [40] Mark Fitzpatrick, a non-proliferation specialist, said: "It is a big risk for Obama because te deal implicitly accepts Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment. And it delays the sanctions that are seen aspart of the key to an ultimate solution." [41]
Despite the fact that the agreement basically contradicts the UN Security Council, which demands a stop to all Iranian uranium enrichment, it does not contain a clause guaranteeing the removal of the already imposed sanctions on Iran. Those sanctions are rather light, however, their maintenance is a steady reminder that Iran must still prove the innocence of its intentions and ambitions. [42]
