Institute for Contemporary Affairs
 Vol. 9, No. 5 29 July 2009
Syria and Hizbullah After the Lebanese Elections
by  David Schenker

 Hizbullah has enjoyed an enviable run of political and military "achievements" including its "divine victory" over Israel in 2006, the "glorious day" in May 2008 when it occupied Beirut, and securing diplomatic recognition by Britain in April 2009. More recently the Lebanese Shiite militia has been dealt a series of setbacks including defeat in the Lebanese elections, the arrest of an Egypt-based Hizbullah cell, reports of the group's involvement in the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafiq Hariri, the apprehension of a Hizbullah cell plotting to bomb the Israeli embassy in Azerbaijan, and the post-election protests in Iran that have irreparably damaged the legitimacy of Hizbullah's chief patron. Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri appears to be leaning toward a cabinet formula that provides his majority coalition with 15 seats, the opposition with 10, and the allegedly neutral president with 5. But if even one of the president's cabinet designees is sympathetic to Hizbullah, the Shiite militia would attain its coveted veto power, effectively erasing March 14's hard-won victory at the polls. The desire in Washington and Riyadh to repair damaged relations with Damascus is admirable, but should not come at the expense of Lebanon and the larger U.S. strategic goal of weakening Iranian influence in the Levant. While a diplomatic rapprochement with Syria might result in some marginal improvements in its behavior, this would likely have little impact on Syria's thirty-year strategic relationship with Tehran. Washington can do little to help March 14 on the ground, but it will be particularly important to demonstrate ongoing U.S. commitment to Beirut at this sensitive time. At a minimum, Washington should veto any deal emerging from Riyadh and Damascus that undermines Lebanese sovereignty or re-establishes Syrian influence in Beirut.