DURBAN
II PLANNING
Anne Bayefsky
National Review Online, February 19, 2009
President Obama had been warned to avoid having anything to do with the U.N.’s Durban II “anti-racism” conference this year.… Ignoring these warnings, the sent a seven-person delegation to a preparatory meeting in
Geneva
this week—without asking anything of conference sponsors in return. The State Department explained the decision as an effort “to try to change the direction in which the Review Conference is heading.” But the delegation’s behavior during the week, which began by expressing “strong reservations about a document singling out
for criticism,” more closely resembles a double-cross.
On Wednesday, the European Union proposed a provision for the final document—which is to be adopted formally at the Conference itself in April—on the Holocaust. The EU had attempted to add a reference to the Holocaust at the last preparatory meeting (in January), which the
did not attend. But and
had objected. The EU proposal was therefore “bracketed”—entered into the items-in-dispute category. Both and
had claimed there weren’t enough facts about the Holocaust to warrant a definitive denunciation.
had also complained that the proposal was in the wrong section. So the EU tried again, and this time the American delegation was present. Here is how the discussion went:
European Union: We have a new proposal under the section on education and awareness-raising that would recall the U.N. General Assembly resolution on the remembrance of the Holocaust. It would read: Urges states to raise awareness and to implement U.N. General Assembly resolutions 60/7 and 61/255 which inter alia observes that the remembrance of the Holocaust is critical to prevent further acts of genocide, condemns without reservation any denial of the Holocaust and urges all states to reject denial of the Holocaust as an historical event, either in full, or in part, or any activities to this end.
: My delegation thinks that this is an inappropriate place to incorporate this new paragraph, so we request that this new paragraph be put in brackets.
Chair: Is there any delegation wishing to comment on this new proposal by the European Union? It doesn’t seem the case. We move on.
Since the operating principle is consensus, this put the Holocaust provision in dispute. But the American delegation chose not to go on the record strongly supporting the EU’s proposal, as it had on other items. Not a peep came from the “change the direction in which the Review Conference is heading” folks. Here’s an even more troubling example, this time involving a paragraph the Palestinian delegation proposed Tuesday in the presence of the American representatives:
Palestine
: I would like to propose a new paragraph which reads as follows:
Calls for an end of all actions violating international human rights and humanitarian law, the respect for the principle of self-determination and an end of all suffering. Calls also for implementation of international legal obligations, including the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the wall, and the international protection of the Palestinian people throughout the occupied Palestinian territory.
Chair: Now let’s move on to paragraph . . .
Dead silence again, despite the fact that an objection could have made a real difference by putting the paragraph unequivocally in dispute. Everybody knew that there was no other country-specific provision in the 250-paragraph-plus document. Yet there were no comments objecting to the idea of singling out
in an anti-racism manifesto, and no call for a paragraph decrying racism in any other state. Instead, the Palestinian and EU delegations have confirmed that in a backroom deal, the EU agreed ahead of time not to object. Members of the American delegation might not have known of the arrangement in advance (highly unlikely), but regardless, they got tongue-tied when it mattered.… In other words, it didn’t take President Obama’s delegation two days before it sat in silence while
was singled out as guilty of racism—again. Why would the delegation behave this way? The idea, seemingly, is to make it appear to an American audience that the Conference’s prospects are improving, that there are no intense disagreements. Just business as usual at the U.N., where multilateral engagement is always a force for good. The less said by the
, the smoother multilateralism proceeds.… The pace of the preparatory meetings also suggests an intent to keep real conflicts out of the public eye. Only 15 percent of the proposed text has so far been adopted, and 30 percent of the proposals have never been reviewed. Most of the remaining preparatory meetings are not scheduled until April, just prior to the actual conference. What is more visible is that the
has little to gain for itself—or for global human rights—from participating. Under the consensus rule, many important suggestions have gone unadopted. A proposal to condemn human-rights violations based on sexual orientation ran into immediate objections from , , , , , , , , Holy See, , , and
.
said no to a provision that sought to make violence against women and children a criminal offence.
balked at a call for states to promote gender equality, and at a suggestion to ensure that the concept of multiculturalism is not used to infringe human rights. strategy is evidently to announce the
participated actively in the planning session, made proposals, and was given a warm welcome. Continuing efforts to improve the final result, it will be argued, are therefore warranted. The pace is sufficiently slow that this refrain will be repeated until it is so late in the day that walking out would cause a major diplomatic furor, which will in turn be used to justify attendance at the Conference itself. Obama’s hunger for engagement, in and of itself, is apparently his first priority.
is way down on the list and American first principles are now subject to discussion. By contrast, what President Obama could have done was to explain to the American public that Durban II is a continuation of
Durban
I. Its purpose is to foster the implementation of Durban I’s Declaration and, at a minimum, to reaffirm it. Because of the Durban I Declaration’s treatment of – a modern form of anti-Semitism—alone, the
should continue to reject it. Not to mention the multiplicity of attacks on basics like free speech, equality, liberty, and security that are still in the Durban II draft. It should have been that simple. But the behavior of the
delegation gives every indication that the pretense of change just around the corner will trump the obligation to give Americans the straight goods.
(Anne Bayefsky is a senior fellow with the Hudson Institute and at Touro College,
New York
.)
OBAMA’S HIGH-RISK ENGAGEMENT AT ‘
DURBAN
II’
Gerald Steinberg
Jerusalem
Post, February 16, 2009
The Obama Administration’s decision to jump into the preparations for the UN’s Durban Review Conference, scheduled for
Geneva
in April 2009, is a bold but also a risky move. Beyond the specific results in this case, the results will set the tone for relations with
, the challenge of radical Islam, chances for progress in George Mitchell’s peace efforts, and the policy based on engagement and dialogue.
, , , the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other paragons of human rights have used this framework for antisemitism and to demonize
, advance Holocaust denial and make a mockery of human rights. They have also attempted to legislate against free speech, using allegations of “Islamophobia” to block criticism of extremism and violence. and have lost hope and pulled out, and some European officials have spoken about not participating, but are now waiting for the results of the
policy. If the Americans succeed in reversing this agenda in the brief time that remains, it would mark a major success and set the stage for restoring
influence and values. Proponents of engagement argue that the Obama Administration can help steer this UN conference so that it actually focuses on discrimination against minorities around the world, and is not another platform for anti-Israel obsession. Alternatively, if this strategy fails, and the text remains poisonous, an American-led walkout with the 27 members of the European Union and some others would delegitimize the
Durban
process. However, if
Washington
hesitates and compromises, allowing the OIC and like-minded NGOs to control the agenda, the participation of the world’s democracies will do immense damage. It will amplify the impact of the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism, including the NGO Forum which used terms like “apartheid” and “racism” to isolate
. Using the
Durban
strategy, Palestinians launched terror attacks with the knowledge that the Israeli responses would be condemned as “war crimes”, which, in turn, would justify boycotts on the South African model. Instead of negotiations based on acceptance of
, the goal of annihilation was reinforced. In parallel, Durban has advanced the radical Islamist agenda, justifying violent attacks against critics, and further narrowing free speech, including in
Europe
. The preparations for the April 2009 conference all point to the same agenda. In parallel, the obstacles to hopes of reversing the course of the Review Conference were highlighted by the exploitation of human rights rhetoric, double standards, and legal processes initiated against Israeli officials in Spain and elsewhere, stemming from the IDF’s Gaza operation. NGO superpowers such as Human Rights, Amnesty International, Paris-based FIDH, and Oxfam, along with Palestinian NGOs (such as PCHR, which is funded by European governments), Libyan-backed groups, and many others are central in this form of deadly warfare, and will be active in
Geneva
. With such high stakes, the failure to defeat the
Durban
strategy will intensify hatred, and carry a major cost for the Obama Administration’s policy of dialogue and engagement with opponents. In 2001, the American and Israeli delegations went to
Durban
expecting that reason and decency would prevail; but when this proved futile, their walkout came too late. To avoid a repetition, the
needs to show moral leadership and, if necessary, readiness to admit that dialogue has failed.
(Gerald Steinberg chairs the Political Science department at Bar Ilan University,
and is Executive Director of NGO Monitor.)
