WILL BE A QUAGMIRE FOR AL QAEDA
Joseph Lieberman
Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2009
Although President Barack Obama and all of us in Congress are understandably focused on the economic crisis, we also face multiple crises in the rest of the world—beginning with the war in
. Security there has been deteriorating as the insurgents have grown in strength, size and sophistication, expanding their influence over an increasing swath of territory. Reversing the downward spiral will not be easy. But as Gen. David Petraeus once said of another war, “Hard is not hopeless.” And we possess considerable strengths in this fight.
The biggest strength is the American military, which through the crucible of
has transformed itself into the most effective counterinsurgency force in history. Although and
are very different, many of the guiding principles of counterinsurgency do apply to both theaters—most importantly, the need to provide security for the population. Moreover, our troops will be redeploying from to
with the momentum, experience and morale that comes with success.We also have an ally in the Afghan people—a proud people with a proud history. Although their frustration with our coalition is growing, Afghans are not eager to return to the tyranny and poverty of the Taliban. That is why the insurgents have not won their support and must resort to self-defeating tactics of cruelty and coercion. The other critical strength, and reason for hope, is the broad support for success in
in the new administration and Congress. Mr. Obama has made clear this is a war he intends to win. He has pledged to deploy more troops and appointed one of our most talented diplomats, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, as special envoy for and
. The combination of Mr. Holbrooke and Gen. Petraeus led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is not a team to bet against. That, then, is the good news. The bad news is that, even if we do everything right, conditions are likely to get worse before they get better… we must match the coming surge in troop strength with at least five other “surges” equally important to success.
*
First and most importantly, we need a surge in the strategic coherence of the war effort. As we learned in
, success in counterinsurgency requires integrating military and civilian operations into a seamless and unified strategy. In
, we do not have in place a nationwide, civil-military campaign plan to defeat the insurgency.… This is an unacceptable failure.… * Second, we need a surge in civilian capacity. The U.S. Embassy in
Kabul
needs to be transformed and expanded, with the necessary resources and the explicit direction to work side by side with the military at every level. In particular, the civilian presence must be ramped up outside our embassy…. * Third, we need to help surge the Afghan war effort. This means expanding the Afghan army to 200,000 or more, and ensuring they are properly equipped, paid and mentored. The
needs to take tough action to combat the pervasive corruption that is destroying the Afghan government and fueling the insurgency. This requires a systemic response, not just threatening specific leaders on an ad hoc basis. Specifically, we must invest comprehensively in Afghan institutions, both from top-down and bottom-up. * Fourth, we need a surge in our regional strategy. As many have observed, almost all of
’s neighbors are active in some way inside that country. Some of this activity is positive—for instance, aid and investment—but much of it is malign, providing support to insurgent groups. We must… empower… Afghans to stop their neighbors from using their country as a geopolitical chessboard.
The can help by beginning to explore the possibility of a [10 year] bilateral defense pact with
Kabul
, which would include explicit security guarantees.… Nothing will discourage [Kabul’s neighbors] destabilizing behavior better than a long-term American commitment to
. * Fifth, success in
requires a sustained surge of American political commitment to the mission. Fortunately, and unlike
, the Afghan war still commands bipartisan support in Congress and among the American people. But as more troops are deployed to
and casualties rise, this consensus will be tested.… Why is this war necessary? The most direct answer is that
is where the attacks of 9/11 were plotted, where al Qaeda made its sanctuary under the Taliban, and where they will do so again if given the chance. We have a vital national interest in preventing that from happening.… [T]he war on terror will end… not when we capture or kill Osama bin Laden or Mullah Omar—though we must do that too—but when we have empowered and expanded the mainstream Muslim majority to stand up and defeat the extremist minority. That is the opportunity we have in today: to make that country into a quagmire, not for
but for al Qaeda, the Taliban and their fellow Islamist extremists, and into a graveyard in which their dreams of an Islamist empire are finally buried.
(This op-ed is adapted from a speech Senator Joseph Lieberman delivered last week at the Brookings Institution.)
AFGHAN ANSWERS
Amir Taheri
New York
Post, February 5, 2009In President Obama’s first week in office, the Taliban launched an unprecedented attack, destroying a strategic bridge over the Khyber Pass via which troops in are supplied from
. Although largely ignored by the American media, that was a major coup, demonstrating the vulnerability of US logistics.… In any case, sending more
troops may not be the most important change to make in Bush policy. Obama needs to consider what the national interests in
are, and how best to serve them. The first interest is not to allow
to become a haven for terrorists once again. Yet this isn’t an exclusively American interest. Yes, al Qaeda had a clear anti-US agenda—but the
intervention also decimated 60 or so other terrorist groups, including the Taliban, which had never been specifically anti-American before 2001. The
destroyed the Afghan bases of:
· The Chechen rebels—whose losses allowed Vladimir Putin to win his war in and become, in effect, the new czar of
.
· The Jaish Muhammad (Muhammad’s Army) and Lashkar Tayyibah (Army of the Pure), enemies of fighting for the “liberation” of
Kashmir
.
· The Al-Sayyaf (The Swordsman) group, which operates in the
.
· The Uighur Liberation Front, which has fought ’s “occupation” of
East Turkestan
(Xingjian) since the ‘40s.…
Other groups suffering near-mortal blows from the intervention had goals centered on , , , , , , Egyptian and
. Plus, the Americans helped kill or capture 200-plus jihadists of European nationality who’d gone to Afghanistan to prepare for “reconquest,” first of Spain and then of the rest of the old continent.… Obama should ask all countries that have benefited from the intervention in
to make contributions (in blood and/or treasure) commensurate with their gains. [He] should also realize that supporting a highly centralized presidential system in —a country that has always been a loose federation of ethnic and religious communities—is in not the best interests of the
. He should urge an amendment of the Afghan constitution to transform the nation into a parliamentary democracy with federal structures. The
has no interest in fighting for the current ruling elite—which, regardless of the merits of its members, has little grass-roots support. This is all the more so because that elite, mired in corruption, has developed a “room service” mentality, depending on the Americans to do all the work.… is holding elections this year and this could provide an opportunity to press for constitutional amendments to broaden the base of the government and create an all-inclusive system, as is the case in
today. Many groups now fighting in are disgruntled Pushtun tribes and clans that resent their exclusion from power, and have no particular animosity toward the
. In , Gen. David Petraeus showed the Arab Sunni tribes that
was not their enemy. A similar policy could do wonders in such parts of as
Helmand
, Arzangan and Kunar. Except for the remnants of al Qaeda and a few Iranian-financed Puhstun groups, almost all fighting groups could be woven into the fabric of a new, federal
. What is needed is a political project, not a military plan to send more troops—who could become trapped in endless guerrilla war with their supply routes under increasing attack.… [T]he
military presence should be focused on building the new Afghan military—a task that has not received the attention it merits. In 1950-51, the Americans created a new army of almost half a million in
within 10 months. It is surprising that they’ve failed to do the same in
in seven years. (The new Afghan army has an effective force of 40,000, mostly to protect the new elite.) A timetable envisaging the withdrawal of all foreign troops by 2014 seems realistic. That would enable
to amend its Constitution, hold two sets of elections, create a new coalition government and complete the construction of its new army and security apparatus. Given vision and perseverance, the war in could be won, as it was in
.
THE SURGE
NEEDS
Ann Marlowe
New York
Post, February 15, 2009
The Taliban’s synchronized suicide bombings on government buildings in Kabul this week will no doubt intensify President Barack Obama’s desire to bring security to
. On the campaign trail, Mr. Obama pledged to make the country the centerpiece of his foreign policy, calling for an Iraq-like surge of thousands of troops. Recently, he and Vice-President Joe Biden have also made it clear that they’ve lost patience with President Hamid Karzai’s weak leadership and his toleration of corruption. But the surge that needs isn’t in
troops, it’s in strengthening governance and Afghan security forces. Without improvements in these areas, no president and no amount of troops can stabilize
. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, currently in the region, should make it clear to the Afghan people, if necessary through a blunt announcement, that the
prefers Mr. Karzai not seek another term. Mr. Holbrooke should also meet immediately with the Afghan Parliament to discuss what can be done to improve governance, and to discuss possible changes to the disastrous 2004 Afghan constitution. There are three big structural problems enshrined in that document. First, the 34 provincial governors are not elected, but appointed and removed at will by the president. Second, members of parliament are elected on a provincial rather than on a district basis. And third, provincial councils are elected on a provincial rather than on a district basis and have no official policy role. Another issue is the absence of political parties.… Afghan citizens can’t hold their representative accountable for local conditions, and representatives don’t have ties to specific constituencies. (Imagine the entire New York State Assembly coming from
Brooklyn
.) Worse, these representatives, despite being closest to the people, serve nothing but an advisory role, and it’s mainly the American military that listens to them at all. Mr. Karzai lobbied the United Nations hard to discourage the formation of political parties, and he got his wish. This is the major reason why the country is in the laughable situation of having no declared opposition candidates for a (late) presidential election slated for August. Without parties, power aligns along traditional tribal and ethnic lines, and provides ample opportunity for drug gangs and foreign governments to buy politicians. Any Afghan MP will tell you that the Pakistanis, Iranians and Russians buy MPs. In terms of security, the
must throw additional support behind Afghan security forces, particularly those who fight the insurgency on the most grass-roots level, the Afghan National Police (ANP). We’ve poured a lot of money into the ANP since we took over training from our NATO allies—the current annual budget is around $800 million—but we should be spending more. It’s more effective, and cheaper, than anything we can do with our troops in many areas. At present,
only has a fraction of the number of police it needs. Some 77,000 cops serve a nation of 32 million people…. This already small force is being eroded by a shocking combat death rate and resulting high attrition. Last year 1,215 out of 77,000 police were slain by insurgents, and an additional 2,600 police were wounded or missing in action. This amounts to one out of 20 cops killed or wounded in 2008.… With increased American support, the ANP can become a success story like the Afghan National Army. A widely respected institution, the army is modernizing rapidly, with 41 of its 69 battalions “capable of independent planning, execution, and sustainment of counterinsurgency operations,” according to American military trainers. Increasing the size of the army is a good idea. So is paying current soldiers enough so they remain in the army. The Taliban’s increasing boldness and the incompetent presidency of Hamid Karzai are symptoms of deeper problems: illiteracy, a nonexistent civil society, undeveloped national institutions, and pervasive corruption. Reversing these trends will take years. But within the term of Mr. Obama’s presidency, there’s much that can be done to restore
to order.
