U.S. Foreign Policy after the Elections:

Pragmatism, But in What Direction?

Harvey Sicherman

BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 52, December 23, 2008

http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives52.html

Executive Summary: Obama's appointments in the foreign policy field suggest

pragmatism and caution, not dogmatism and adventure. Therefore, the question

regarding the Obama Administration’s foreign policy is not about competence but

of direction. Will the pragmatics lead him or will he lead them? The record of the socalled

pragmatics is less than stellar; had it been up to them, Saddam would still be

in Kuwait, Germany might still be divided, and most recently, the Iraq surge would

not have occurred. This paper reviews the international challenges for the Obama

team in dealing with the economy, the war on terrorism, and Russia.

The American way in foreign policy depends heavily on the President. Does he know

what he wants to do? Does he have a team capable of doing it? The answers to these

questions define the character of an administration’s actions abroad.

Thus far, President-elect Obama’s appointments suggest he has two models in mind.

His selection of Hillary Clinton for Secretary of State imitates Abraham Lincoln’s “team

of rivals,” apparently motivated by a desire to co-opt his main political competition in

the Democratic Party. Admirers of Lincoln’s cabinet, however, have neglected to

mention that it proved quite unworkable and Lincoln had to run the Civil War around

it.

In this respect, we must understand that unless a secretary of state enjoys 110%

support from the president, the post is one of the weakest in the cabinet. The budget is

small, the employees few, and nearby sits the Congress, always ready to offer advice

and admonition. The secretary often bears bad news for a president, requiring him to

spend precious political capital his advisors would rather retain for domestic use.

Secretary-designate Clinton therefore will have to convince Washington and the world

very quickly that she really does represent President Obama.

The second model is reflected by the appointment of General Jones as National

Security Advisor. This appears to replicate President George H. W. Bush’s selection of

General Scowcroft, an experienced and disciplined practitioner of the bureaucratic arts.

In 1989-92, Scowcroft skillfully avoided the usual clashes between the White House

and the State Department that often disfigures American foreign policy.

Most important is the overall combination. The president-elect has drawn on “the

pragmatics” from both parties: Senator Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,

General James Jones, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, and Attorney General Eric Holder.

All have “centrist” track records, not as great conceptualizers but rather as people who

know how to get things done and disparage ideological rigidity.

President Obama, however, was elected on the theme of change. He and his team of

pragmatics will face three quick tests of leadership: the economy, the War on

Terrorism, and Russia.

The Economy

The U.S. economy must be Obama’s central focus, which has an important

international dimension. Two leaders, Britain’s Gordon Brown and France’s Nicolas

Sarkozy, have filled the vacuum produced by President Bush’s eclipse as his

unpopular presidency winds down in the midst of a disastrous made-in America

economic crisis. Sarkozy, in particular, has asserted a French role. Still, one should

notice that the G-8 have given way to the G-20. In that larger forum, the United States,

rather than the Europeans, can offer broad leadership. A point to watch will be the U.S.

relationship with China, both in trying to revive the global economy and to increase

environmental standards. President Obama may also have a tricky passage within his

own party, whose protectionist wing in Congress will have the lopsided U.S.-China

trade imbalance in its sight.

The War on Terrorism

There are both conceptual and geopolitical issues regarding the War on Terrorism.

Among the national security team, the Attorney General-designate Eric Holder will

play an important role. The president-elect, a part-time professor of constitutional law

at the University of Chicago, not only wants to close the Guantanamo prison but also

has spoken of using the U.S. civilian court system to deal with terrorists. This signals a

very different approach from the Bush era.

The geopolitical side to the war includes Iraq, the Arab-Israeli “peace process,” and

above all, Iran. A clue to Obama’s strategy may be found in that quintessential

statement of the pragmatics, the Baker-Hamilton Study Group of 2006. Now almost

forgotten, President Bush rejected its main recommendation for an Iraqi draw down,

choosing instead the “surge.”

The Study Group, however, had other suggestions, including diplomatic overtures to

Syria and Iran, and fresh Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Arguably, the Annapolis

Conference in January 2008 can be traced to Baker-Hamilton. Now, as the military

focus shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, we should therefore expect a direct diplomatic

attempt to convert the arsonists in Damascus and Tehran into firefighters. Indeed,

Senator Clinton advocated the invention of a regional “stability forum.” Obama seems

convinced that a kind of ultimatum can be handed to Iran: no terrorism and no nukes

equals entry into the American-led paradise, or failing that, more political isolation and

economic sanctions. The president-elect has not ruled out force, including a restriction

on Iran’s import of refined petroleum products.

The pragmatics may agree on the importance of attempting Iranian and Syrian

diplomatic conversions, but they are split over how to handle the Israeli-Palestinian

negotiations. All acknowledge the necessity of a “process”; but some, notably the

Brzezinski-Scowcroft wing, think an Israeli-Palestinian settlement is an essential first

step, more so than any other move, and that a proclaimed U.S. plan of settlement is a

vital part of achieving it. Others, including most of the pragmatics, argue that a quick

agreement is not attainable, especially given Palestinian weakness and Israel’s electoral

schedule.

The Middle East, of course, has been known justifiably as a burial ground for

diplomatic reputations. Therefore, we can expect a certain amount of “due diligence”

before either the president or the secretary of state fling themselves into a forward

position on such initiatives. The pragmatics, after all, rest their prestige on knowing

“how to do it.”

Russia

Third, and last, will be the Russian test. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President

Dmitry Medvedev have made crystal clear in the wake of the Georgia clash that they

do not regard the post-Cold War settlement in Europe, especially NATO’s expansion

beyond the German border, as legitimate. Where will NATO take its stand? Will

Georgia and Ukraine be admitted, an idea firmly opposed for now by France and

Germany? Obama has been lukewarm about deploying parts of a missile defense

system in the Czech Republic and Poland; the pragmatics do not all agree on the

importance of this deployment either. NATO, however, supported it on December 3,

2008, laying down a marker for the Russians and the incoming administration.

What Obama does on this matter will also be seen in concert with his requests of the

Conclusion

President-elect Obama has cast his lot with the “pragmatics” of both parties, thereby

fashioning a sturdy coalition or consensus. This is in keeping with his political pattern.

Co-opting Senator Clinton, although obviously a political choice, brings to the post of

secretary of state a personality whose foreign policy positions are also those of the

same consensus, exemplified by the Baker-Hamilton Study Group.

The U.S. foreign policy establishment has greeted Obama’s appointment with some

relief; none of them are dogmatists. They know how to move from point A (where we

are) to point B (were we would like to be) when point B appears realistic. But the

record of the pragmatic types on defining point B is not so stellar. Had it been up to

most of them, Saddam would still be in Kuwait, Germany might still be divided, and

most recently, the Iraq surge would not have been tried, consigning the United States

to disastrous defeat. The question about the Obama Administration’s foreign policy is

therefore not competence but direction. Will the pragmatics lead him or will he lead

them?

*********

Harvey Sicherman is President and Director of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

He has served as Special Assistant to Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (1981-82)

and was a member of the Policy Planning Staff of Secretary of State James A. Baker, III

(1991-1992). These remarks are based on his December 2, 2008 lecture at the annual

Wollinsky symposium on "Global Challenges 2009" at Bar-Ilan University, cosponsored

by the BESA Center, FAES, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute of

Philadelphia.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Littauer Foundation