On November 10, 2008, shortly after the election of Barack Obama as America's new President, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyid Erdogan announced his wish for Turkey to be a "mediator between the new Obama administration and Iran". According to Erdogan, a new era in relations between Turkey, Iran and the U.S. is about to be opened with Obama as the President elect. "We are ready to be the mediator. I do believe we could be very useful," Erdogan said ahead of a visit to the U.S. [1]

Below is a backgrounder on the deepening economic and military ties between Turkey and Iran.

Turkey and Iran are the region’s most populous nations, with 64 million and 70 million people, respectively. While Turkey and Iran are historical and in some ways contemporary rivals the two countries have growing trade relations and are currently negotiating expanded energy cooperation.

In November, Turkish Energy Minister Hilmi Guler will go to Tehran to finalize a gas deal with Tehran. According to the Turkish Daily “Yeni Shafaq”, Turkey and Iran have completed talks about investment and gas production. [2] The newspaper wrote: “Despite the strict sanctions for firms investing in energy fields in Iran […], Turkey seems to be determined to continue, and even boost its cooperation with Iran in energy field.” The article also quoted Hilmi Guler saying: “Transferring Iran’s gas to Europe through Turkey is a finalized business deal. The EU needs Iran’s natural gas, and Turkey needs the money it can gain from buying and selling this product." [3] During the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in August 2008, Turkey and Iran had failed to finalize expected energy deals. [4]

On August 14, 2008, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited Turkey to discuss his country’s nuclear programme and growing bilateral ties with his counterpart President Abdullah Gul. Turkey has offered to help resolve a dispute between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear programme. Turkey’s secularist establishment views Ahmadinejad with suspicion; previous Turkish President Ahmet Necdet had refused to invite Ahmadinejad at all during his presidency. Radical newspaper reported that Turkish authorities had been forced to move Ahmadinejad’s visit to Istanbul and make it a working trip rather than an official visit because he did not plan to visit Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s burial place, modern Turkey’s revered secularist founder. [5]

Military and Economic Dimensions

As a historical adversary of Iran, Turkey indeed has managed to steer a remarkable course in foreign policy in recent years, maintaining cordial relations with Tehran even as it remains a key U.S. ally and the only Muslim country with high-profile military cooperation with Iran’s arch-rival, Israel. [6] Now, the European Union’s move to negotiate Turkey’s membership means Europe could soon share a border with Iran. [7]

Turkey, however, faces a host of new challenges to continuing its balancing role in the region. Iran’s push for nuclear weapons—which analysts fear could prompt such regional powers as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey itself to develop a nuclear deterrent—is a case in point.

As a Muslim (albeit secular), non-Arab nation, Turkey can advise Tehran with a credibility that the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) could not match when they tried unsuccessfully to convince Tehran to drop its nuclear program. But if diplomatic efforts over Iran’s nuclear program continue to falter, Turkey is the only country in Iran’s vicinity on which the United States has pre-positioned tactical nuclear weapons (an estimated 90) that it could deploy against Iranian facilities. [8]

• Iran exports about 10 billion cubic meters of gas a year to Turkey. Turkey will play a major role as transit country for Iran’s gas exports to Europe. [9]

• Ankara and Tehran have signed $1.5 billion in agreements providing for the joint construction of three 2,000-megawatt thermal power plants -- two in Iran and one in Turkey, and several hydroelectric plants in Iran with a total 10,000-megawatt capability. Under terms of the agreement, Ankara will import 3 billion to 6 billion kilowatt hours of electrical energy annually. At present, Iran exports electricity to Turkey through two transmission lines totaling 250 megawatts. [10]

• During a joint news conference in Istanbul in November 2007 with Iranian Energy Minister Parviz Fattah, Turkish Energy Hilmi Guler said, "The signing (of agreements) will continue. Our efforts are continuing." [11]

The reality for Turkey is that it currently imports 90 percent of its energy needs at a time of record-high oil prices. In addressing this economic reality, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan on September 20, 2007, said Turkey relied on imports from Iran and Russia and it would be "out of the question to stop imports from either country." [12]

Early cooperation between Iran and Turkey was rooted in the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) - an intergovernmental regional organization established in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey for the purpose of promoting economic, technical and cultural cooperation among the member states. It was the successor organization of what was the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), founded in 1962, which ended its activities in 1979 with the advent of Khomeini in Iran. [13]

The current level of economic cooperation between Tehran and Ankara is unexampled in the history of the two countries’ relations, Mottaki stated in his meeting with the Turkish Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee chairman. The top diplomat added the extended cooperation in oil and gas industry can serve as a model for expansion of relations in other fields. [14]

• Irans Foreign Minister Mottaki said during a meeting with a Turkish delegation in December 2007: "A powerful and modern Turkey is in Iran's interest. The current level of economic cooperation between Tehran and Ankara is unprecedented in the history of the two countries' relations. The extended cooperation in oil and gas industry can serve as a model for expansion of relations in other fields as well." Iran-Turkey relations have significantly improved during the AKP rule. [15]

Turkey will not want to jeopardize its trade relations with Iran. Bilateral trade jumped to an estimated $4 billion in 2005, up from $1 billion in 2000, and new deals between the two nations will further cement their economic ties:

• In August 2007 Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent his energy minister, Hilmi Guler, to Iran to conclude a raft of deals. They include the creation of a joint company to carry up to 35 billion cubic metres of Iran’s natural gas via Turkey to Europe and the building of three thermal power plants by Turkish companies in Iran.

• In June 2007 Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding under which Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Turkey’s state-run company, will operate in Iran and exploit three natural gas areas in the South Pars region. The company plans to invest $3.5 billion to operate these fields. Moreover, the two countries will build a 2000-km pipeline between them to transport Iranian gas to Europe. [16]

Turkey insists that it has the right to pursue its economic interests. And Iran is delighted: “Nobody can come between Iran and Turkey,” Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said recently. [17]

Nevertheless, these economic ties have not quelled Ankara’s anxiety over a nuclear-armed Iran. Until recently, Turkish officials publicly supported Iran’s quest for nuclear energy while privately expressing their fears.

Then in 2006 Turkey’s ambassador to the United States, Faruk Logoglu, changed course. Speaking publicly at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, he said Iran’s nuclear weapons would be a serious threat to security in the Middle East. [18]

The Nabucco Pipeline

To cement their mutuality of interests in this project, Iran and Turkey countries signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on July 14, 2007 related to gas and oil transit and joint energy investments. The pipeline is designed to be 3,500 kilometers (2,200 miles) long, to transport up to 40 billion cubic meters (1.4 trillion cubic feet) of gas annually. The estimated cost of construction is €5 billion, to be borne in equal shares by a consortium of five countries -Austria's OMV AG, Hungary's MOL, Romania's Transgas, Bulgaria's Bulgargaz and Turkey's BOTAS (Turkey's petroleum pipeline corporation). Turkey is pivotal because the pipeline must traverse its territory. Turkey will be a beneficiary in four ways: First, it will secure a supply of natural gas; second, it will collect transit fees; third, it will bargain for preferential prices for the Iranian gas; and fourth, as a leading conduit of gas to Europe, it will enhance its eventual integration into the European Union by earning points for diversifying routes and supplies away from Russia. [19]

In July 2008, Iranian Oil Minister Gholam-Hossein Nozari announced that Ankara and Tehran are negotiating on an increase in natural gas exports to Turkey and on supplying the country with more gas during the winter. [20] Ahmadinejad’s visit to Turkey at this time sends a clear message that energy cooperation is an important aspect of the two nation’s bilateral ties.

The Persian Pipeline

Turkey and Iran have held talks regarding the construction of the so-called “Persian Pipeline”, a new natural gas pipeline that will go from the South Pars oil field to the border of a town called Bazargan, which is a border post between Iran and Turkey. [21] According to Reza Kasaeizadeh, managing director of the National Iranian Gas Export Company (NIGEC), the “Persian Pipeline” would take gas to Turkey, Greece, Italy and other European countries. “We are negotiating with Turkey over this (Persian Pipeline). Turkey itself is interested in this." [22]

However, according to Turkish sources, Turkey is opposed to the project of a new pipeline transporting natural gas to Europe, but rather wants Iran to pursue the Nabucco pipeline.

South Pars Gas Field

The Turkish state-owned petroleum company TPAO will explore in Iran’s South Pars gas field. Gas will be piped to Turkey for consumption or re-export to European markets. [23] Earlier problems on planned investments in the South Pars gas fields have been resolved; Turkey and Iran may sign a production accord in November. [24]

In July 2007, Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding, allowing TPAO to pump 20 billion cubic meters of natural gas from the South Pars gas field. In support of this agreement, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said: “We import oil and natural gas. We want to reduce the amount we pay for our imports." [25]

I-Gas 9 Pipeline

The I-Gas 9 pipeline, that has already been established, was designed to take gas to the Turkish border with a capacity of 100-110 million cubic meters a day. Reza Kasaeizadeh said that the first gas flows could start in 2014. [26]

UN Security Council

On October 18, 2008, Turkey has been elected to hold a member seat in the UN Security Council for two years. [27] Turkey is supposed to be dealing with the task of “negotiating the Council’s primary agenda: The Iranian nuclear program.” Turkey presented itself as the “diplomatic link” between the East and West, “a strategic partner of both the US and Iran, and – as a Muslim country- having a unique sensitivity." [28]

Historical and Cultural Dimensions

Today’s Turkish-Iranian relations are shaped by the historic rivalry between the Ottoman and Persian empires of yore. The Ottoman Empire, from which modern Turkey evolved, controlled all the Central Asian Republics. The mistrust towards Iran among Arabs, Turks and other Muslim nations of the greater Middle East has always been there. During the Ottoman era, Iran and Ottoman Empire couldn’t be allies, and couldn’t ensure any serious economic or political co-operation. To this day Turkey resents Iran’s meddling in the affairs of these nations. [29]

Long-standing cultural and religious differences shape the relationship as well. The Turks are mostly Sunni Muslims, but Turkey includes a Shia minority that is widely viewed as “second class.”

Iran’s state religion is Shiite Islam and most of its people are ethnically Persian, but minorities of various ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds number in the millions, including ethnic Kurds, Baluchis, and the largest ethnic minority, the Azeris. [30] Azeris, comprising a quarter of Iran’s population, are ethnically Turkish and their language is a Turkish dialect. Iran and Turkey share a common problem with their Kurdish minorities, although this constitutes more of a problem for Turkey than for Iran. Turkey’s stand points are being completely opposite to revolutionary Iran in almost all fields. Turkey has been emerging as a new role model for many Iranians. [31]

While both countries are Muslim, Turkey has had a long tradition of a secular and democratic political system. The changes that took place in Turkey in recent years under the AKP government have not affected its economic policies, which remained free market oriented. By contrast, Iran is a theocratic state with aspirations of regional hegemony and an active supporter of terrorism. [32]    

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References:

[1] Tavernise, Sabrina: "Turkey volunteers to mediate U.S.-Iran talks," International Herald Tribune, November 12, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/12/europe/12turkey.php

[2] „Turkish energy minister to visit Iran in November,“ IRNA, October 26, 2008, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=180830

[3] „Turkish daily says UN fails in anti-gas deal attempt,“ IRNA, September 28, 2008, http://www2.irna.ir/en/news/view/line-18/0709280259193243.htm

[4] „Turkey, Iran may sign energy investment deal in November – report,“ HotNews Turkey, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/finance/10192158.asp?scr=1

[5] Elci, Zerin: „Ahmadinejad to visit Turkey for nuclear talks,“ Reuters, August 4, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUKL433438920080804?sp=true

[6] Athanasiadis, Iason: “Turkey Feels Iran Chill,“ Asia Times Online, January 24, 2006,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HA24Ak02.html

[7] Ottolenghi, Emanuele: “Europe: See No Evil,“ The Transatlantic Institute, November 3, 2004,
http://www.transatlanticinstitute.org/html/pu_articles.html?id=104

[8] Ibid.

[9] Blair, Edmond; Kalantari, Hashem: „Iran:sanctions hinder, don’t stop gas export aim,“ Reuters, October 27, 2008, http://africa.reuters.com/energyandoil/news/usnBLA737962.html

[10] Daly, John C.K.: „Analysis: Turkey-Iran energy ties,“ United Press International, November 30, 2007,
http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Energy/Analysis/2007/11/30/
 analysis_turkey-iran_energy_ties/2595/

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Raphaeli, Nimrod: „The growing economic relations between Iran and Turkey,“ MEMRI, January 6, 2008,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=economic&ID=IA41408

[14] „Iran, Turkey play key role in regional security: Turkish MP,“ Tehran Times, December 26, 2007,
http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=159983

[15] „Iran, Turkey Most Significant Regional Powers,“ Fars News Agency, December 27, 2007,
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8610060226  

[16] Ozertem Hasan Selim: „Pipeline Politics and Turkey, “ The Journal of Turkish Weekly, July 31, 2007,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2683 

[17] “Too Energetic a Friendship,“ The Economist, August 23, 2007,
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9687845

[18] Athanasiadis, Iason: „Turkey feels Iran chill,“ Asia Times Online, January 24th, 2006,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HA24Ak02.html

[19] Raphaeli, Nimrod: „The growing economic relations between Iran and Turkey,“ MEMRI, January 6, 2008,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=economic&ID=IA41408

[20] „New Iran-Turkey gas pipeline in the works,“ PressTV, July 5, 2008,
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=62634§ionid=351020103  

[21] „New Iranian gas pipeline for Turkey,“ Anatolia News Agency, July 1, 2008, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=108683

[22] Blair, Edmond; Kalantari, Hashem: „Iran:sanctions hinder, don’t stop gas export aim,“ Reuters, October 27, 2008, http://africa.reuters.com/energyandoil/news/usnBLA737962.html

[23] „Turkey, Iran may sign energy investment deal in November – report,“ HotNews Turkey, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/finance/10192158.asp?scr=1

[24] „Turkey, Iran may sign South Pars gas deal in November,“ Invest in Turkey, October 27, 2008, http://www.invest.gov.tr/haber_display.aspx?haberID=11622

[25] „Turkey may develop Iran’s South Pars,“ PressTV, July 2, 2008, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=62247§ionid=351020103

[26] Blair, Edmond; Kalantari, Hashem: „Iran:sanctions hinder, don’t stop gas export aim,“ Reuters, October 27, 2008, http://africa.reuters.com/energyandoil/news/usnBLA737962.html

[27] „Turkey admitted to U.N. Security Council,“ The Journal of Turkish Weekly, October 18, 2008, http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=60308

[28] Albertine, Alexander: „Turkey’s Task: Dismantling Nuclear Iran,“ The Washington Post/Newsweek, October 24, 2008, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/sais/nexteurope/2008/10/turkeys_task_dismantling_nucle.html

[29] Laciner, Sedat: „Mistrust Problem in Turkey-Iran relations,“ The Journal of Turkish Weekly, February 21, 2008,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2839

[30] Beehner, Lionel: “Iran´s Ethnic Groups,“ Council on Foreign Relations — Backgrounder, November 29, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/12118/

[31] Ibid.

[32] Raphaeli, Nimrod: „The growing economic relations between Iran and Turkey,“ MEMRI, January 6, 2008,
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=subjects&Area=economic&ID=IA4140_________________________________________________________________