Sarkozy in Syria: Discrepancies

in French Mideast Policy

Tsilla Hershco

BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 48, September 10, 2008

http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives48.html

Executive Summary: France is seeking to upgrade its status in the international

arena and enhance its influence and presence in the Middle East. France perceives

Syria as a key to resolving central regional issues such as the crisis in Lebanon, the

Iranian nuclear problem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sarkozy's visit to

Syria in early September and the summit he convened of the leaders of Syria,

France, Turkey and Qatar – all are part of this turbo-charged Sakozian diplomacy.

However, deep skepticism is in order as to the utility of Sarkozy's Syrian

courtship. There is a disturbing discrepancy in French diplomacy between firm

rhetoric and acceptance of fait accompli, as has been the pattern in the Lebanese

crisis. This suggests to countries such as Syria that the West is weak and ready for

far-reaching concessions in return for vague Syrian declarations of good intent.

France is acting as if "dialogue" and a "diplomatic role" (for France) are significant

objectives in and of themselves, while the efficacy and results of its diplomacy are

very questionable.

France, Syria and Lebanon

France has deep historical, cultural and emotional ties to Lebanon. In February 2005,

Lebanon became a bone of contention in French-Syrian relations. Syria was widely

regarded as responsible for the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, former Prime Minister

of Lebanon and close friend of French President Jacques Chirac. Subsequently,

France unequivocally demanded that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon,

refrain from meddling in internal Lebanese affairs, and cooperate with the UN

international tribunal established to investigate the Hariri assassination. In addition,

France demanded that Syria abide by the 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701

and prevent the transfer of arms from Iran to Hizballah.

The accession of French President Nicolas Sarkozy in May 2007 was marked by

continuity in French attitudes towards Lebanon and Syria. Much like his

predecessor, Sarkozy emphasized his uncompromising support for Lebanon's

territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence. Therefore France refrained from

engaging Syria through high-level diplomatic contacts as long as Syria did not

demonstrate its willingness to contribute to France’s intensive efforts to promote a

dialogue between the opposing Lebanese factions, in order to end the political

stalemate and prevent the outbreak of a new civil war in Lebanon. The crisis was

aggravated in November 2007 by the opposition’s refusal to vote for a newly elected

presidential candidate following the end of the tenure of former Lebanese President

Emil Lahoud.

Hizballah's armed onslaught on government positions in May 2008, as well as

against pro-governmental Sunni and Druze factions, went unopposed by the army

and left 65 dead. As a result, Signora's government yielded to Hizballah's demands.

In the Doha Accord of May 2008, it was agreed that Michel Suleiman, former

Lebanese army commander, was to be elected President, that a new government was

to be formed in which 11 of 30 ministerial portfolios were to be assigned to the

Hizballah bloc (effectively granting Hizballah veto power), and that a change in the

election system would be effectuated leading up to the general elections in 2009.

Moreover, following pressure by Hizballah and in defiance of UN Security Council

Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government agreed that Hizballah maintain its

weapons arsenal and even authorized it to proceed with its independent military

struggle against Israel.

France embraced these developments, presenting the Doha Accord as an

achievement of French diplomacy and praising it as a symbol of hope, despite the

fact that it was imposed by Hizballah's undemocratic coup de force, backed by its

Iranian patron. France probably regarded the accord as a scenario that, while

France, Syria and Iran

In contrast to the Lebanese context, in which France ought to appease Iran's allies,

Hizballah and Syria, Sarkozy continues to lead a hard line against Iran's nuclear

project. Sarkozy perceives Iran's nuclear aspirations as a major threat to world

security. Consequently, France advocates further UN and EU sanctions. However,

Sarkozy explicitly has expressed his objection to military action against Iran,

asserting that both an Iranian bomb and an Israeli bombardment of Iran would

constitute catastrophic developments.

Sarkozy's rapprochement with Syria might represent Sarkozy's objective to distance

Syria from Iran, thus neutralizing or reducing Iran’s influence in the region. Sarkozy

has asked the Syrian president to make use of his close ties with Iran in order to

convince Ahmadinejad to comply with the international community’s requirement

that Iran renounce its nuclear project. Sarkozy stressed, though, that Iran has the

right to posses civilian nuclear technology for peaceful means and even offered

French cooperation, as he had done in the past for a range of Arab countries.

Assad indeed spoke to Ahmadinejad about the issue – but not in the way Sarkozy

was hoping. During his two-day visit to Teheran in August, Assad announced the

strengthening of the economic relations between the two countries and

expressed his support for Iran's right to enrich uranium. He stressed that Syria

opposes the introduction of nuclear arms into the region, but said that the problem is

France, Syria and Israel

Another central objective of Sakozy's visit to Syria was his involvement in peace

negotiations between Israel and Syria, which are currently taking place under the

auspices of Turkey. Sarkozy declared his satisfaction that France, thanks to the

amelioration of its relations with both Syria and Israel, could serve as a trusted

mediator. Indeed, Assad invited Sarkozy to take part in the peace negotiations;

however, he rejected Sarkozy's proposals to conduct direct dialogue with Israel.

Assad equally refused to recognize Israel before its formal commitment to comply

with prerequisite Syrian demands, that would first lead to direct dialogue, next to a

peace treaty, and finally to formal recognition. The Syrian president also declared he

was waiting for the new US administration before moving forward toward concrete

stages of the negotiations. It seems that even on this issue, Assad did not give his full

commitment to grant French diplomacy a leading role, probably as a result of a lack

of trust in France’s ability to guarantee implementation of any such agreement.

Conclusion

At present, French-Syrian rapprochement appears to be more rewarding for Syria

than for France. Despite his country’s newly gained international legitimization,

Assad has not rewarded the French by breaking his ties with terrorist organizations,

most notably Hizballah. Neither has he distanced himself from Iran. Seemingly, no

tangible, unequivocal commitment was given by Syria throughout its renewed high

level contacts with France or throughout the indirect peace talks between Syria and

Israel.

There is a disturbing discrepancy in French diplomacy between firm rhetoric and

acceptance of fait accompli, as has been the pattern in the Lebanese crisis. This

suggests to countries such as Syria an undesired image of Western weakness; a

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Dr. Tsilla Hershco, a Research Associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic

Studies, specializes in Franco-Israeli relations and French Middle East policy.

BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Littauer Foundation