PRESIDENT OBAMA AND THE
MIDDLE
EAST
CHALLENGE
Jonathan
Rynhold
BESA
Center
Perspectives Papers No. 50, November 6, 2008
Obama’s Foreign Policy Outlook—One of the main themes of Obama’s campaign was “change,” including a rejection of George W. Bush’s “ideological” approach to foreign policy, in favor of “pragmatism.” Whereas Bush viewed the world in terms of good and evil and asked countries to choose sides, Obama speaks in terms of bridging divides.…
—The key dividing line between Obama and Bush is the Iraq War, which Obama opposed.… Obama advocates a staged withdrawal of US forces over a period of 18 months, at the end of which the
will retain a military force “over the horizon.” Simultaneously, he plans to push a comprehensive regional and international diplomatic initiative, which includes and , designed to broker an end to civil war in
…
—Obama recognizes that a nuclear is a major threat to the stability of the
Middle East
and a global threat to the non-proliferation regime, which he has championed. He has not ruled out the use of force, and he promised both AIPAC and Israeli leaders that he will do everything in his power to prevent
from obtaining nuclear weapons. But his policy is, first and foremost, to vigorously pursue direct negotiations in which he will offer “big carrots and big sticks.”…
The Arab-Israeli Arena—Obama differed from the norm for candidates in US elections. His rhetoric was certainly pro-Israel; but it was not uncritical.… [H]e came out clearly against settlements and what he termed the “Likud approach” to the peace process. Joe Biden also indicated a willingness to confront the pro-Israel lobby by declaring that AIPAC does not define the meaning of being pro-Israel.…
Obama has promised to make the peace process a “key diplomatic priority”; though he has rejected the idea of an imposed settlement. He views the conflict as a “constant sore” that affects
foreign policy. He argues that the US must work towards a settlement, not only for its own sake, but also because it will assist the war on terror and remove the excuse of Arab regimes for blocking the social, economic, political, and education reforms that are needed to deal with the underlying causes of instability and extremism.…
Facing Reality—Difficult Choices—Reality has a way of forcing a president to make hard choices, by prioritizing some polices over others. Obama’s primary focus is bound to be on ensuring the recovery of the American economy.…
[I]t is important for Obama to realize that while containing and managing the Arab-Israeli conflict is a vital US interest, resolution of the conflict is a secondary concern. The
will probably need to engage in peace process diplomacy for a variety of reasons, but the prospects for implementing a workable Israeli-Palestinian final settlement are poor indeed.
Moreover, the central strategic challenge emanates from Tehran, not
Jerusalem
or Ramallah. This is a message he is bound to hear not only from but also, privately, from
’s Arab allies. A nuclear will trigger the nuclearization of the
Middle East
more broadly, which could allow radical actors access to these dangerous weapons.…
Carrots and Sticks—On a more fundamental level there are bigger questions about Obama’s strategy of multilateral engagement. Obama criticized Bush for pursuing a policy based mainly on sticks, but he could have equally criticized
Clinton
for focusing too much on carrots. Obama seeks to entice and
to cooperate by offering them economic and political benefits based on inclusion in the global liberal economic system and an honorable place at the table in a multilateral, but still American-led, global order. In the past, as part of the carrot for peace, the Syrians and Palestinians were offered aid packages worth tens of billions of dollars by
Clinton
; yet they refused. At least part of the reason for this is that these authoritarian regimes view economic liberalization and normalization as a threat and not as an opportunity.…
The Implications for Israel—There is no doubt that McCain would have been the more comfortable option for
. If Netanyahu does form the next Israeli government, there could be difficult times ahead.… In the past, Netanyahu was able to work with a Republican-led Congress to thwart a Democratic president hamstrung by political intrigue. This time Obama will have a Democratic-led Congress. In addition, the new dovish “
J Street
” lobby would support Obama against Netanyahu and would lessen the ability of AIPAC to challenge Obama. On the other hand, Netanyahu, if elected, may well adopt a relatively pragmatic position, and
attention may be focused elsewhere.
More broadly, Obama’s preferences regarding and have serious implications for
. If the US were to leave Iraq unstable, with the perception being one of American weakness and failure, it will strengthen the resolve of all radical forces in the region that threaten Israel and its de facto allies in the Arab world, such as Jordan. also fears that any US-Iranian grand bargain could come at its expense in terms of an arms control regime that could be detrimental to
or in terms of American policy on the Palestinian issue. Finally,
is concerned that the Iranians would simply use the dialogue to buy time, as they have done with the Europeans for years.…
Conclusion—Aside from his policy preferences, Obama’s foreign policy will be dependent on his managerial and decision-making abilities. He is smart and has run a superb campaign, but he lacks experience. The real tests are yet to come, and given the volatility of the
Middle East
, they will come thick and fast. In such situations, ideologues can fall back on a set of assertions that provide a clear guide for resolving ambiguity; pragmatists have to be more analytical and pay attention to shifting realities. The central challenge for Obama in the
Middle East
is neither democratization nor securing a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (though those are worthy long term objectives), but rather the maintenance of a stable pro-American balance of power in the region. First and foremost that means dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue.
(Jonathan Rynhold is senior lecturer of political studies at
Bar-Ilan
University
and
a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.)
